CVE-2023-52934

Medium

In the Linux kernel, the following vulnerability has been resolved: mm/MADV_COLLAPSE: catch !none !huge !bad pmd lookups In commit 34488399fa08 ("mm/madvise: add file and shmem support to MADV_COLLAPSE") we make the following change to find_pmd_or_thp_or_none(): - if (!pmd_present(pmde)) - return SCAN_PMD_NULL; + if (pmd_none(pmde)) + return SCAN_PMD_NONE; This was for-use by MADV_COLLAPSE file/shmem codepaths, where MADV_COLLAPSE might identify a pte-mapped hugepage, only to have khugepaged race-in, free the pte table, and clear the pmd. Such codepaths include: A) If we find a suitably-aligned compound page of order HPAGE_PMD_ORDER already in the pagecache. B) In retract_page_tables(), if we fail to grab mmap_lock for the target mm/address. In these cases, collapse_pte_mapped_thp() really does expect a none (not just !present) pmd, and we want to suitably identify that case separate from the case where no pmd is found, or it's a bad-pmd (of course, many things could happen once we drop mmap_lock, and the pmd could plausibly undergo multiple transitions due to intervening fault, split, etc). Regardless, the code is prepared install a huge-pmd only when the existing pmd entry is either a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd, or the none-pmd. However, the commit introduces a logical hole; namely, that we've allowed !none- && !huge- && !bad-pmds to be classified as genuine pte-table-mapping-pmds. One such example that could leak through are swap entries. The pmd values aren't checked again before use in pte_offset_map_lock(), which is expecting nothing less than a genuine pte-table-mapping-pmd. We want to put back the !pmd_present() check (below the pmd_none() check), but need to be careful to deal with subtleties in pmd transitions and treatments by various arch. The issue is that __split_huge_pmd_locked() temporarily clears the present bit (or otherwise marks the entry as invalid), but pmd_present() and pmd_trans_huge() still need to return true while the pmd is in this transitory state. For example, x86's pmd_present() also checks the _PAGE_PSE , riscv's version also checks the _PAGE_LEAF bit, and arm64 also checks a PMD_PRESENT_INVALID bit. Covering all 4 cases for x86 (all checks done on the same pmd value): 1) pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge() All we actually know here is that the PSE bit is set. Either: a) We aren't racing with __split_huge_page(), and PRESENT or PROTNONE is set. => huge-pmd b) We are currently racing with __split_huge_page(). The danger here is that we proceed as-if we have a huge-pmd, but really we are looking at a pte-mapping-pmd. So, what is the risk of this danger? The only relevant path is: madvise_collapse() -> collapse_pte_mapped_thp() Where we might just incorrectly report back "success", when really the memory isn't pmd-backed. This is fine, since split could happen immediately after (actually) successful madvise_collapse(). So, it should be safe to just assume huge-pmd here. 2) pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge() Either: a) PSE not set and either PRESENT or PROTNONE is. => pte-table-mapping pmd (or PROT_NONE) b) devmap. This routine can be called immediately after unlocking/locking mmap_lock -- or called with no locks held (see khugepaged_scan_mm_slot()), so previous VMA checks have since been invalidated. 3) !pmd_present() && pmd_trans_huge() Not possible. 4) !pmd_present() && !pmd_trans_huge() Neither PRESENT nor PROTNONE set => not present I've checked all archs that implement pmd_trans_huge() (arm64, riscv, powerpc, longarch, x86, mips, s390) and this logic roughly translates (though devmap treatment is unique to x86 and powerpc, and (3) doesn't necessarily hold in general -- but that doesn't matter since !pmd_present() always takes failure path). Also, add a comment above find_pmd_or_thp_or_none() ---truncated---

Package Linux Kernel
Published 2025-03-27
Last modified 2025-10-28
CVSS version 3.1
Patch available
Yes

CVSS 3.1 score

4.7

out of 10
Medium
Attack Vector
Local
Attack Complexity
High
Privileges Required
Low
User Interaction
None
Scope
Unchanged
Confidentiality
High
Integrity
None
Availability
High
Vector string
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H

Weakness type

CWE-362

CVE-2023-52934 is a Race Condition vulnerability

What is Race Condition?

The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, creating unexpected states. Learn more on MITRE CWE

Affected versions

Linux kernel versions 6.1 and later are affected. Fixed in 6.1.11, 6.2 and their respective stable series.

Affected from
≥ 6.1
Fixed in
✓ 6.1.11 6.1.x ✓ 6.2

References

The following references provide additional information about CVE-2023-52934 including vendor advisories, patch commits, exploit details, and third-party analysis. Links are sourced from the NIST NVD database.

Frequently asked questions

  • What is CVE-2023-52934?

    CVE-2023-52934 is a Medium severity Linux kernel vulnerability with a CVSS score of 4.7 out of 10 , classified as a Race Condition flaw (CWE-362) . It affects Linux kernel versions from 6.1 onward and has been patched in 6.1.11 and 6.2. CVE-2023-52934 has not been confirmed as actively exploited and is not listed in the CISA KEV catalog.

  • What is the CVSS score for CVE-2023-52934?

    CVE-2023-52934 has a CVSS score of 4.7 out of 10, rated Medium severity (CVSS 3.1). The vector string is CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:H/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:N/A:H .

  • Is there a patch available for CVE-2023-52934?

    Yes — CVE-2023-52934 has been patched. Fixed versions include 6.1.11 and 6.2. If you are running Linux kernel 6.1 or later up to the fix versions, apply the relevant patch for your kernel branch.

  • Is CVE-2023-52934 actively exploited?

    No — CVE-2023-52934 has not been confirmed as actively exploited. It is not listed in the CISA Known Exploited Vulnerabilities (KEV) catalog.

  • What is Race Condition (CWE-362)?

    The product contains a code sequence that can run concurrently with other code, creating unexpected states. View CWE-362 on MITRE CWE →